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In a famous study published in 1978, the American diplomat  Anton DePorte argued – 
controversially – that a Europe held in frozen check between the superpowers was the only 
sound basis upon which the continent could find peace. The ending of the bloc system in 
Europe between 1989 and 1991 put paid to this dystopian vision. Indeed, within only a few 
years,  many writers were even beginning to suggest that the new united Europe might one 
day become a superpower in its own right. As we now know, this early wave of unbridled 
optimism has given way to an altogether more downbeat mood. In this article, it shall be 
argued that the prevalent pessimism about Europe is not just a function of what has been 
occurring within Europe itself. It is also a reflection of the fact that the international order, 
which during the 1990s seemed to be so benign, has become much less so over the past 
fifteen years. A close examination of Europe’s relationships with the three great powers the 
United States, China and Russia indeed suggests that the world is likely to become more, 
rather than less, difficult for Europe as it moves forward into the 21
st
 century Testing times 




 In a period of great transatlantic uncertainty Europe’s priority should be to reinforce 
its economic, political and strategic links with the United States  
 Russia’s growing suspicion of, and opposition to the European Union  as a project 
requires a  strong and  united response from all European leaders  
 While the economic benefits of good economic relations with China should be 
recognized, it is important for Europeans to recognize the challenge which the  PRC 
presents to  Europe’s  vision of the world.  
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History as prologue 
As one war drew to an end, and another longer Cold War began to announce itself, Winston 
Churchill took the very long view about a world that had been so unceremoniously smashed 
into fragments after 1914. What we had been through, he observed, was not a mere political 
revolution or a massive clash of arms, but rather something closer to a ‘Second Thirty Years 
War’ (Tooze, 2005, p. 4). Treating the period like a single unit, he focused unsurprisingly on 
what he saw as the long-running struggle by the British Empire to contain and finally defeat 
the German challenge. But as Britain had emerged victorious by 1945, the Empire, in his 
view, was now safe. The same could not be said, however, about mainland Europe itself. . 
Indeed, if one result of total war between 1939 and 1945 was in the short term to leave much 
of the continent in rubble, another much longer term consequence was to undermine Europe  
as the axis around which the world had for nearly three centuries revolved. Certainly, if we 
consider the international system in terms made popular by Paul Kennedy as an ever moving 
canvass of rising and falling great powers and regions, then by 1945 it was patently clear that 
the European age had finally come to an inglorious end (Kennedy, 1987). 
The question remains whether or not Europe could have retained the mighty position it 
had held at the beginning of the century. The gradual economic rise of the United States 
constituted a challenge of the first order, to which  Europe may never  have found an 
adequate response. The British especially seemed to  be concerned about  what one British 
writer in 1901 termed ‘Americanization’ and the impact this was likely to have on the rest of 
the twentieth century (Stead, 1901). However, economics alone would not have turned the 
world upside down so fast nor so completely. As one of the more acute insider witnesses to 
both wars noted (Keynes, 1971). Europe’s position at the heart of the world system was not 
just undermined by the economic power of the US, but rather by two wars which left Europe 
dependent on American largesse. Continental Europeans may not have liked this altered state 
of affairs - and Britain as the once dominant power may have liked it least of all. But one 
thing was clear. The European ‘moment’, which had announced itself in the late 15th century 
had finally passed. As one of the more noted post-war historians pointed out not long after 
the end of World War II,  the "collapse of the traditional European system” had become “an 
irrevocable fact” Historic Europe'” was now  “dead and beyond resurrection" (Holborn, 
1951).  
Naturally, not all Europeans felt especially comfortable with either their diminished 
role  in world affairs or  being dependent on the United States. Indeed, at least one West 
European leader in the form of de Gaulle went on to challenge the new American primacy in 
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the 1960s (Cohen, 2015). Nor  did all Europeans – particularly those under Soviet tutelage - 
readily accept the subsequent division of the continent. However, what might have seemed 
temporary just after the war soon took on the appearance of permanence. Crises came and 
went, from the Hungarian revolution in 1956 through the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 
to the Polish crisis of the 1970s, but nothing  ever really changed. Moreover, as  the years 
rolled by, several analysts began to assume that the ‘new’ status quo was here to stay. One 
American policymaker with a more acute sense of history even supposed that a Europe 
divided between the superpowers was the best guarantee for long-term stability: DePorte was 
insistent. Europe he opined was less likely to go to war now or even become seriously  
unstable. After all, in the new Europe, the age-old German problem  had been solved; 
aggressive nationalism was now contained within the ‘two bloc’ system; and France and 
Germany had at last found a way to co-exist peacefully as neighbours. Nor of course was 
there much chance of the US retreating from Europe so long as the USSR remained where it 
was. Therefore, he cautioned on the dangers of challenging the new status quo, arguing that if 
the Cold War in Europe ever was to end – something which seemed deeply unlikely -  then 
the old tensions and stresses could very easily return (DePorte, 1978).  
Nonetheless, the system DePorte had so brilliantly rationalised back in the late 1970s 
did come to an end. What is more, with the exception of subsequent developments in former 
Yugoslavia, the dismantling of the two bloc system occurred without the disastrous 
consequences he had earlier forecast. Moreover, as time passed,  and the European 
Community of old gave way to a new Union, the emerging entity slowly but surely  moved 
from being a  successful experiment in Europe to becoming something with real international 
potential. Indeed, by the turn of the century it very much looked as if Europe was not only not  
‘missing’ the Cold War - as some realists had earlier predicted (Mearsheimer, 1990) -  but 
was fast becoming a major global actor in its own right. Several writers in fact  began talking 
about the new Europe in increasingly grandiloquent terms. Charlie Kupchan was one. 
America he argued in a much quoted study was facing an increasingly uncertain future. 
Europe on the other hand could look forward to the 21
st
 century with confidence (Kupchan, 
2002). Jeremey Rifkin agreed. The American Dream he claimed was dead or dying: Europe’s  
however was just beginning (Rifkin, 2004). Others  concurred,  including the irrepressible 
Mark Leonard. Europe (or more precisely the EU)  he  insisted was not simply doing well 
economically. There was every chance he believed that it  would go on to ‘run the 21st 
century’  (Leonard, 2005). Nor was this his view alone. Indeed, yet another enthusiast boldly 
declared at around the same time that  while the American Century was fast coming to an end  
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Europe’s was only just beginning. (Reid, 2004). Nor was it just a question of capabilities. The 
new Europe – this enigmatic power as one writer called it (Laidi, 2008) - was much better 
designed to succeed in a globalized world  where trade rather than weapons, and treaties 
rather than tanks, were  fast becoming the truest  measures of  power. (Cooper, 2000). 
Normative power Europe it seemed could face the future with much greater confidence than 
martial America.  
As we now know, things did not quite turn out that way. Indeed, the Europe  which 
many believed might one day be the next superpower  (albeit a quiet one according to 
Moravcsik (2009 )) was fast turning into what George Soros later came to term a ‘tragedy’ 
(Soros, 2014). With unemployment on the rise,  an increasing political gap opening up 
between the north and the south of Europe and a growing debt mountain it was hardly 
surprising that Europe started to look like a  failed project. Perhaps Garton Ash captured this  
new mood best.  As he wryly observed, had be he been  ‘cryogenically frozen’ in 2005, he 
would have gone to his ‘provisional rest a happy European’. However, had he then been 
‘cryogenically reanimated’ a dozen years later, he ‘would have immediately died of shock’ 
(Ash, 2017). Nor, of course were these his views alone. In fact, after 2010 at least,  such 
pessimistic sentiment had become more or less mainstream. Thus according to Heisbourg by 
the Europe ‘dream’ was  well and truly over (Heisbourg, 2013). A year later and Offe was 
insisting that  Europe had become ‘trapped’ (Offe, 2014). In 2015 Friedman was writing 
gloomily about an almost impossible to solve ‘crisis’ (Freiedman, 2015) And a few months 
later the ever critical Varoufakis insisted that until Europe changed direction economically, 
then it had no future at all. As it was, it would, for the foreseeable future,  simply have to 
suffer what the weak and the powerless always suffered (Varoufakis, 2016).  
In the rest of this article my purpose is not so much to discuss either the contested 
causes and complex consequences of what  is now regularly referred by pundits as Europe’s 
‘existential crisis’ but rather focus instead on the world outside the EU, and in particular on 
how important changes and shifts  in the international system -  quite independent of what is 
currently happening within Europe itself -  have further contributed to the continent’s 
problems. My thesis is a simple but important one: at the start of the new millennium, Europe 
was situated in a relatively benign international environment. Now, nearly two decades later, 
that environment has become much benign. Most obviously, Europe now faces an America 
which  is both less interested and less sympathetic to the needs of its Transatlantic partner. 
This trend was evident long before anyone considered the prospect of Donald Trump 
becoming the next US president. Now, however, following his successful election, the 
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situation has changed decidedly for the worst. Europe  also faces a second challenge: namely 
a dynamic and increasingly competitive Asia,  and within the Asian region an equally 
dynamic and competitive (not to mention authoritarian) China playing by a set of rules  
which present a serious problem to  the  way Europe would wish to see the world organized. 
Finally, Europe confronts something much closer to home: a  more assertive Russia under a 
determined leader whose motives are no doubt mixed  but one of whose objectives  is to 
challenge the very idea of a democratic and united Europe. It  would be difficult enough if 
Europe were only  facing  one of these ‘threats’. The fact that it is facing all three at the same 
time – and at a moment in time when Europe itself  has massive problems of its own - - 
means that deeply difficult and potentially disturbing times lie ahead for a project which only 
a few years ago was being likened by one writer to an ‘empire’  (Zielonka,  2007)  yet only a 
few years on – according to the same analyst – seemed to be ‘doomed’  (Zielonka,  2014)   
  
Troubles in Transatlantia: the United States   
In the literature, it has become almost axiomatic to argue that the relationship between 
Europe and the United States is a  very special one – a ‘security community’ by any other 
name tightly held together by a number of overlapping interests, a similar set of values and 
membership pf the same western clubs, which, of course, they also happen to run. Realist and 
sceptics have at times challenged this reading – none more controversially than Robert Kagan 
in the early years of the Bush administration. This so-called community he argued merely hid 
the fact that both looked at the world in entirely different ways (Kagan 2002).  But all to no 
avail. Indeed, the more Kagan argued that the two were drifting apart fast, the more his critics 
emphasised the enormous economic ties linking the two continents and their shared goals in 
maintaining a liberal economic order. Peter Baldwin went even further in a powerful study 
comparing the two societies. The differences between the two, he opined, were minimal. But 
it was precisely because they were so ‘minor’ (to use his term)  that many people on both 
sides of the Atlantic tended to  claim that there was a vast gap indeed  -  not because there 
was in fact but rather as means of establishing their own respective identities (Baldwin, 
2009). 
Still, there was  no hiding the fact that in a post Cold War environment, which lacked a 
single unifying threat to hold the alliance together, the bonds that once united the two were 
becoming weaker. In addition, significant generational and demographic changes in the 
United States also tended to accentuate the drift. Put simply, the generation of Americans that 
fought alongside European allies in World War II is no more. Moreover, in the past fifty 
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years, the US American population has diversified, with stronger Asian and Latino elements 
and less white and European influence: This change has inevitably frayed the ‘natural’ bonds 
that once held Europeans and Americans united. Indeed, if current trends continue, then by 
the middle of the 21
st
 century the United States will have become a very different kind of 
country in terms of its population. Of course, such a transition could be read as a sign of 
multicultural success. Other analysts s are more reserved. Among this group, the American 
political scientist Huntington has put the controversial question whether or not the US would 
remain as the country it had once been if this trend were to continue and fewer and fewer of 
its citizens came from the traditional European ‘stock’ (Huntington, 2004). 
Other factors, too, have tended to compromise the quality of the transatlantic 
relationship. One, quite clearly, has been the ongoing problem of financing international 
security in general and European security in particular. Ironically, what was earlier known 
during the Cold War as ‘burden-sharing’ segued into something much more divisive once the 
USSR had disappeared – in part because military spending in Europe went into a nosedive 
and  in part because NATO spending, which had been skewed from the beginning, became 
even more so once the Cold War had ended. This growing asymmetry might have caused 
political embarrassment in Europe.  But more importantly, it caused (and continues to cause) 
even greater  irritation across the Atlantic in Washington. And one can easily understand 
why. In 2016 the US contributed around USD 650 billion to the NATO budget of  USD920. 
Meanwhile, the Europeans  only  contributed USD 250 billion. Nor is this all. Not only does 
the US account for more than two thirds of all spending on NATO, it also spends just under 4 
per cent of its GDP on defence,  while the average defence budget of most Europeans 
countries is just about half that, with the richest European member Germany coming in at 
well below 2 per cent (Kottosova, 2016).  
Beyond the question of spending, NATO itself has also become the source of 
transatlantic friction. President Trump may have expressed himself on this issue in his 
typically brutal way when he argued that the organisation was becoming ‘obsolete’. 
However,  the unfortunate fact remains that Trump’s claim has only made public what other 
Americans have been saying privately for some time. Of course, NATO still has strong 
bipartisan support in the United States for the simple reason that NATO helps guarantee  the 
US a foothold in Europe. Indeed, according to a former NATO commander, the organisation 
was not  merely useful, it was also ‘the foundation’ upon which ‘U.S. foreign policy’ rested 
(Hobson, 2016). Still,  questions continue to be asked about the utility of fighting war by 
‘committee’. Significantly, neither the US-led war against the Taliban in Afghanistan nor the 
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invasion of Iraq were initiated as NATO operations; and when NATO finally did get involved 
in Afghanistan, the Americans tended to be highly critical of their allies’ efforts. In addition, 
when in 2011 NATO took on the responsibility of intervening in Libya – albeit with a high 
degree of logistical support from the Americans –Obama attacked the British and the French 
later for failing to follow through after the war had been won on the ground. This was not 
only less than diplomatic. To many European observers it seemed downright disloyal  
(Goldberg, April 2016). 
Yet perhaps one should not have been so surprised. Obama may have been  personally 
popular in Europe,  and certainly preferable to his republican predecessor. On the other hand, 
many in Europe did  wonder whether he was really a true ‘Atlanticist’. The son of a Kenyan 
father and an independently-minded liberal white mother Obama was hardly the typical 
American politician. Raised for some years in Hawaii and then Indonesia, where for some 
time he had attended a Moslem school, Obama was bound to bring a fresh new view of the 
world to the White House. And indeed he did. In fact, almost from day one,  he seemed to 
recognize that the world he had inherited was not the world of the Cold War or even the 
unipolar world of the 1990s. Rather it was what Zakaria in a  best-selling book had termed a 
‘post-American’ world, one in which new emerging powers and dynamic new economies 
were beginning to redefine world politics (Zakaria, 2008). In of itself, this new focus should 
not have been a concern to Europe. However, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton began 
to talk in glowing terms of a rising Asia, to which the United States should be tilting,  with 
barely a mention of Europe, the Europeans did start to worry – perhaps with good reason. 
After all, the Obama administration now showed an enthusiasm about Asia that it was no 
longer directing towards Europe. In a well-known speech, Secretary Clinton talked in almost 
world historical terms of America’s next ‘Century’ being a ‘Pacific Century’, since that 
region, with its dynamic economies, was clearly where the future of the world was going to 
be decided (Clinton, 2007). This was by no means her view alone. The leading American 
official on Asian affairs, Kurt Campbell,  also made it clear in an important interview that at a 
‘fundamental level’ most of the history of the 21st  Century was going to be written in the 
‘Asian Pacific region’ and anyone who did not ‘really understand’ this basic fact would be 
missing the point. The Asia region, he concluded, was bound to become ‘the dominant arena 
of strategic interaction’ for the USA in the coming years (Campbell 2011). 
While Asia appeared to be moving up the policy food chain, Europe increasingly began 
to be seen in Washington as a source of problems and woes. Of special concern among US 
policymakers was the Eurozone, whose problems  even the Europeans themselves seemed 
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unable to solve. Moreover, as the crisis deepened, or at least failed to get resolved, American 
opinion became increasingly negative towards Europe with some on the right attacking the 
EU as a failed liberal project (Buchanan, 2016) while others of a more progressive outlook 
asked  whether it could even survive. Stiglitz in particular was especially damning about the 
way in which the EU was  being undermined by the Euro. Adopting a single European 
currency he argued had been a fatal error. The Euro he went on was not only causing a 
recession in those weaker economies where they needed monetary flexibility. If there was no 
reform to the system,   the common currency could easily go on to destroy the European 
project in its entirety. (Stiglitz, 2016).  Even the Obama administration did not remain neutral 
and urged European leaders to abandon what it saw as the dead end policy prescription of 
balanced budgets and deficit reduction (Nelson, 2012).  
Europe, however, seemed to be in no mood to listen to advice coming from across the 
Atlantic. Germany especially saw no reason to change direction while its own economy 
continued to prosper. But as critics went on to point out, Germany’s good fortunes was in part 
based on the economic misfortune  of others. Indeed, while some countries in Europe – most 
notably in the ‘South’  -  were experiencing misery, Germany was benefitting from an inflow 
of both investor cash and young immigrants, if only ‘to escape the dire conditions that 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and EU technocrats had helped create through their hard-
line focus on austerity, structural reforms, and price stability’ (Resinbichler and Morgan, 
2016). No doubt on a personal level, Obama and Merkel enjoyed a decent relationship. 
However, there was no hiding the fact that US relations with its largest and most important 
partner were facing very testing times indeed. Nor, it seemed, was this  just about economics. 
On a whole range of other issues from TTIP through to the use of electronic surveillance of 
German leaders, German views of America were turning decidedly negative (Kundani, 2015). 
The transatlantic relationship therefore was already facing a series of important 
challenges some time before President Trump entered office. But his highly contested 
election turned a  potentially  problematic situation into a critical one, nowhere more 
dramatically than in Germany itself. A new German poll taken in early 2017 indicated as 
much, with only around 30 per cent of people expressing any degree of trust in the new 
American leader (The Local, 2017). Nor was this just a German reaction alone. Across 
Europe, Trump has provoked an almost unprecedented  political storm. His open hostility 
towards the EU, his vocal support for Brexit,  his positive  views about Putin, not to mention 
his rejection of all things liberal, including globalisation, could not but have a disastrous 
impact on European public opinion. Even in Brexit-Britain where the government was 
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desperate to rebuild its ‘special relationship’ with the US after a period of perceived drift, 
Trump remained widely unpopular right across the political spectrum (Colville, 2016).  
Indeed, when it was mooted that he would soon be making a state visit to the UK some time 
in 2017, well over  a million people objected, including many MPs and the Speaker of the 
House of Commons (BBC News, 2017).  Others across Europe were equally concerned. 
Madame Le Pen may have welcomed his election as did others on the far right. But  most 
European opinion formers seemed genuinely appalled. G W Bush they felt had been bad 
enough. But here was  a  newly elected leader of the free world with views closer to those of 
the National Front in France than the political mainstream. Little wonder that not long after 
his victory, The New York Times carried the bold headline ‘For Europe, Trump’s Election Is a 
Terrifying Disaster’. The article continued that hardly anybody in Europe had truly believed 
that Americans would ever elect someone so obviously unfit to lead the most powerful nation 
in the world. Tragically however they  had. And now, across the Continent, it went on, 
‘people were trying to figure out what this would mean’. Many feared the worst. Not only 
would he be bad for America. His election,  the article concluded, might even mean the ‘end 
of the West’ itself. Clearly some very difficult and dangerous days lay ahead (Wergin, 2016). 
 
Rich and rising  China, Democratic Europe 
 If the election of Trump caused Europeans to worry in ways they had not worried for a very 
long time about their relationship with the United States – the EU’s President even talked in 
early 2017 of Trump being a ‘threat’  (Gaouette, 2017) –  they could at least take refuge (and 
many did) in the fact that the two continents were so interconnected that even Trump could 
do no  lasting damage. The relationship might be entering choppy waters. But according to 
some at least it was just ‘too big to fail’.  The West might  yet survive (Cox, 2012a).  Dealing 
with China has posed a challenge of a quite different order,  in  part  one suspects  because so 
much has already been written about China by so many different kinds of people including 
economists (usually very positively), Sinologists (with great reverence), China lovers and 
China -haters  and, of course, by scholars of International Relations. This latter group has in 
turn divided rather neatly into those who feel  China as a rising power can gently ease itself 
into the welcoming arms of the liberal  international order  and  others of a more realist 
persuasion who insist that the outcome is  likely to be anything but peaceful (Buzan and Cox, 
2013). China has in addition been the focus of much speculation about its long term future 
with some  arguing that even if China does go global it will for ever remain a ‘partial power’ 
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(Shambaugh, 2016),  others insisting that its internal politics makes it a ‘fragile  superpower’ 
(Shirk, 2007),  and at least one author (who has now apparently changed his mind) making 
the bold claim that China will one day ‘rule the world’ (Jacques, 2009). Everybody seems to 
agree that China is in some sense ‘rising’. But there is little consensus, or so it would seem,  
about whether it can continue to rise for ever and what all  this might mean for the rest of the 
world. As one writer has put it, ‘the growing number of books and articles on China’s rise, 
whether it is sustainable, whether it is a model for other developing states, and most 
importantly whether it is likely to change the current international order’ only  ‘highlights’  
the extraordinary level of interest  there is  in this  particular question . (Jones,  2014) 
In the wider debate about China in the West the American voice has clearly been 
dominant. Europeans meanwhile – with a few notable exceptions – have tended to focus less 
on the big strategic questions – presumably because Europe no longer does strategy – and 
concentrate instead on economics and how much Europe on the one side and China on the 
other can benefit materially from the relationship. Thus when the British or the Germans ‘go’ 
to China they talk about little else. Of course this does not mean the relationship is not 
without its economic stresses and strains. This while Europe insists  that China is still not a 
full blown market economy and needs to push ahead with more reforms, China attacks 
Europe for not transferring more of its high technology or more sensitively, of not selling the 
PRC  more weaponry. That said, the relationship seems to be functioning to most people’s 
satisfaction with China over the past few years having become the EU's second largest 
trading partner – just behind the United States – and the EU in turn having become China's 
biggest. Moreover, both sides believe the relationship still has a long to go economically. As 
a recent report noted, though the relationship has brought benefits to both sides, investment 
flows continue to show vast untapped potential, especially when taking into account the size 
of the two economies. With China accounting for just 2-3 per cent of overall European 
investments abroad, and Chinese investments in Europe remaining relatively low, it is evident 
that enormous possibilities exist (European Commission, 2016). 
The stress on both sides about the mutually beneficial character of the relationship with 
few of the strategic tensions apparent in say China’s increasingly fractious relationship with 
the United States should not however obscure the very real challenge the new China poses  
for Europe. China is rarely described as a ‘threat’ in the European discourse as it most 
frequently is in the United States. On the other hand, there remain a number of outstanding 
issues.  
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First and foremost there is the challenge posed by China’s almost inexhaustible 
capacity to export or ‘dump’ vast amounts of its low priced goods onto the European market 
– something no doubt welcome by millions of European consumers but not so welcome to 
those industries which have been driven out of business as a result. The numbers of jobs lost 
overall remains difficult to compute but according to one official source at least, anywhere 
between 100,000 and 10 million jobs have been lost to Chinese ‘competition’ since China 
joined the WTO. Nor it seems is the situation likely to improve any time soon given the 
enormous spare capacity in so many Chinese industries. As a European Commission report 
explained, the Chinese government basically has only one priority – and that is to keep as 
many people employed as possible, and one way of doing this of course was and remains 
dumping onto foreign markets – including European markets (European Commission, 2016). 
There is also the additional problem of what might happen in the future if China were to be 
granted full market status? If this were to happen then China, naturally enough, would be 
delighted. But for Europe the results could be economically very damaging indeed with the 
possible loss – according to one report – of somewhere between 1.7 to 3.5 European jobs as a 
result (Louch, 2015). 
While job losses in Europe itself pose a very real challenge to European leaders, so too 
has China’s highly successful drive to win market share – as well as hearts and minds – in 
both Africa and South America. The basic facts are by now clear. In 2000, the two continents 
were effectively within the Western economic sphere of influence. Fifteen years later and 
China had become a significant economic player both south of the Rio Grande and south of 
the Maghreb (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016)  Take Latin America first. Here trade with 
China increased over a nine-year period by over a 1000 per cent, from around $10bn in 2000 
to $130bn in 2009.  Four years on (2013) and the total volume of trade between the two was 
now 24 times larger than it had been back in 2000!  Over the same period China has also 
become the top destination of exports from Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. China’s banks 
have   also gained  a foothold, becoming in the process the largest annual public creditors to 
Latin American governments. In addition, China was fast developing into a major investor 
itself, especially in key extractive industries. Meanwhile, in Africa,  the same pattern could be 
detected. Here, over a mere fifteen-year period, China had moved from being an economic 
irrelevance in 2000 to becoming a major economic player. With its large unconditional loans, 
its support for  a number of well publicized infrastructural projects, and its apparently 
insatiable demand for African raw materials – not to mention the presence of close to a 
12 
million Chinese themselves in Africa – China was clearly becoming a force to be reckoned 
with (Tull, 2008). 
In of itself, none of this when taken together constituted a major threat to Europe per se, 
though for both the US and Europe to see their share of  trade with, say,  Africa fall from 77 
per cent to 60 per cent in a matter of a few years could hardly have been welcome. On the 
other hand, as a number of writers have observed, the China challenge did at least compel 
Europe to respond in a fairly positive way, and to use phrase ‘get its act together’, especially 
in Africa where many of its earlier policies had quite simply failed to deliver (Grimm and 
Hackenesch, 2016). Still, there was room for concern. If, after all, one of Europe’s purposes 
was not merely to do business in places like Africa but facilitate better governance, then 
everything China was  doing was undermining that goal. Nor was China’s goal merely 
economic. Indeed, the more it drew both Latin America and Africa closer to it economically,  
then the more countries there felt  moved  to side with China on international issues – quite 
often against the Western powers. Here of course China had the added ideological advantage 
of being able to claim that like many of the countries in Africa and Latin America it too had 
suffered historically from ‘imperialism’; and that because it had, it was different in character 
to those Western and European powers who had previously treated the colonies,  and latterly 
the Third World, with such contempt (Sverdrup-Thygeson, 2017).  This in part would also 
explain the importance of the BRICs organization to China. Though an organization with 
limited ambitions, the BRICs  did at least provide China with a  real institutional connection 
to two of the  most important countries on both continents: namely Brazil and South Africa. 
United together, as they claimed, in a desire to uphold the principle of non-interference 
against a West which had always stood in the way of their legitimate ambitions, the BRICs, if 
nothing else, provided a not insignificant platform for China, Brazil and South Africa to 
express solidarity while working together to make the international system a more balanced 
place, and certainly one more aligned with their interests rather than those of the established 
Western powers (Laidi, 2012).  
Finally, China poses a problem for Europe in one other important respect:  by providing 
an example of an apparently successful and dynamic economy constructed on a polity that is 
neither liberal in its values or democratic in its practices. China – as the Chinese recognize – 
is almost definitely not a model for export. Nonetheless, it has demonstrated to the wider 
world that however polluted its cities, however unequal its society, and however repressive 
its government – all features which do little to enhance China’s soft power abroad –  it has 
delivered on growth and has also made huge strides forward in reducing poverty. It has also 
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spawned in the process one of the largest middle classes in the world whose children study in 
their hundreds of thousands in foreign universities. This does not always make the Chinese 
popular internationally. But it does point to  a society facing the future with some degree of 
confidence. The global image of modern Europe could not be more different. Thus whereas 
China seems to be (and in many respects is) on ‘the up’, Europe looks to be ‘on the way 
down’. China is every day, and in every way, looking like a country that is on the rise 
economically. Europe on the other hand looks as if it is in long term decline. All this could 
change of course. However, for the time being, Europe very much looks like the ‘sick man’ 
of world politics, while China – and with it Asia more generally – is sending out the very 
clear and unambiguously clear message that it represents the wave of the future. Things may 
be much better than they look (Leonard and Kundani, 2013). Indeed, as I have argued 
elsewhere, the West - including Europe – retains major structural advantages over its various 
peer rivals (Cox, 2011, 2012b). But perceptions matter and for the time being as writers like 
Kishore Mahbubani have triumphantly proclaimed, the world is turning on its axis. The next 
millennium belongs to the ‘East’ (Mahbubani, 2008). 
 
Russian resurgence and Europe  
If contemporary China represents a long term economic challenge for Europe, then Putin’s 
Russia – with whom China has developed an increasingly close relationship (Cox, 2016) - 
poses a more immediate political and perhaps even strategic threat. Russia may well have 
become one of Europe’s biggest trading partners since the fall of the USSR; and the Russian 
market and Russian energy remains of considerable importance to many European countries. 
Nevertheless, what only twenty and twenty five years ago looked like becoming a ‘strategic 
partnership’, and at the turn of the new century a stable relationship based on what even Putin 
then termed core European values, has deteriorated to the point today where Europe and 
Russia look set to remain rivals - and serious ones at that – for a long time indeed 
(Omelicheva, November, 2016). 
How this has come about remains a source of much debate both in Europe and in 
Russia itself. For the Russians the causes of the current crisis are self-evident. The West, it 
claims, has always been reluctant to accept Russia on its own terms. It has therefore 
interfered in Russian internal affairs with the declared purpose of undermining the Russian 
state. More generally, the West has also deployed its own institutions to either encircle Russia 
(in the case of NATO)  or promote Western values (through the EU) all  with the express 
objective of drawing countries within Russia’s sphere into the West’s orbit. Unsurprisingly, 
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this is not how many in the West appear to view the past few years. Russia under Putin – they 
argue – set out on a course to rebuild Russia after a period of precipitate decline in the 1990s. 
The obvious ways of achieving this was first to build a strong state, second to contest any 
Western interference in what he regarded as Russia’s ‘near abroad’ – including especially 
Ukraine - and finally by directly exploiting divisions and weaknesses in the West itself. 
Whether or not Putin had a plan from the outset, or simply developed one as events unfolded, 
is not entirely clear. What is clear that by 2004 relations with the West were already going 
sour, and that nothing which happened thereafter has prevented the situation from getting 
worse. So much worse in fact that by 2017 normally sober and fair-minded analysts were 
already talking of a ‘return’ to a new, and perhaps even more dangerous ‘cold war’ (Legvold, 
2016). 
This  near collapse in the relationship has also been accompanied by a significant shift 
in Russian public opinion.  In 1991 the very ‘idea of the West’ was a  deeply attractive one to 
Russia and many Russians (English, 2000) . This is not how things look today.  Indeed, by 
2015,  negative perceptions of the West in Russia  had risen to the highest level ever recorded 
in the history of Russian public opinion,  with  over 80% of people surveyed now having a 
negative perception of the United States. Even the once popular European Union appeared to 
have lost its allure with just over 70% of Russians now viewing the EU negatively, with  only 
20% having a positive perception.  This was an extraordinary turnaround. After all, in 
January 2013,  before the crisis in Ukraine had unfolded,   only one in a  hundred Russians 
polled saw the EU in a negative light. Two years later,  over 25% of Russians now accepted 
that relations with the EU had become hostile (Lipman, 2015). Many Russians also seem to 
hold the West responsible for their current economic woes.  In fact, of  the 73% who believed 
the economy was in bad shape, Pew found that one-third pointed  to sanctions imposed by 
Western nations as the root cause of their difficulties (Speiser, 2015).  
For many, if not all, Europeans this turn towards confrontation was little short of 
disastrous. After all, as far back as 1999 Javier Solana had spoken ‘longingly’ about the 
mutual economic and political benefits that would accrue to both sides of a new deal between 
the EU and Russia. A year later, the EU and Russia launched their first institutionalized 
framework in the form of the ‘EU-Russian Energy Dialogue’. The two also seemed to be 
united together in their combined desire to combat the growing threat of terrorism. And, of 
course, they shared common borders, a common heritage and a common history. Yet none of 
this prevented the slow and apparently inexorable decline in the relationship. More worrying 
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still fro European leaders was  how Russia’s traditional suspicion of NATO reaching far back 
into the 1990s now began to be turned against the European Union itself (Maass, 2016). 
But perhaps this hostility towards Europe should have come as no surprise. Putin had 
after all made plain his  growing opposition  to the kind of pluralistic kind of society which 
had come to flourish in Europe since the collapse of communism. Europe’s celebration of  
cultural diversity, sexual tolerance and  experimental  life styles were hardly compatible with 
his vision of a society based on traditional practices. Indeed, not only was this idea of 
‘Europe’ something which Putin appeared  to find offensive personally,  one sensed that this  
model of a modern, almost post-modern  Europe,  was itself a deeply subversive one for a 
state desperately seeking to establish its own  identity in a world where the West and its ideas 
still remained extremely influential. Furthermore, in spite of its many problems, Europe itself 
remained  a most attractive proposition for anybody in the former USSR seeking to distant 
themselves from a Russia being run in an increasingly authoritarian manner – as indeed 
became obvious when Ukraine looked like signing an association agreement with the EU in 
November 2013. Putin as we know was having none of it, fearing (with some justification) 
that if such an agreement were successfully implemented then there was the very real risk 
over the longer term potential of Ukraine gradually moving away from the Russian sphere 
and towards the West (Kalb, 2015)   
As is now  widely recognized, Putin’s response to the situation in Ukraine marked a 
major turning point in Russia’s relationship with the West generally and the EU particularly. 
It was one thing for Russia to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine. It had been doing 
that anyway since 1992. It was something else all  together to annex the territory of another 
sovereign state. Nor of course did the crisis end with Crimea. Russia then went on to conduct 
its own proxy war in Ukraine itself while doing its level best to wage many others wars of 
‘disinformation’ in the West. There is even credible evidence to suggest that Russia has even 
been involved in financing or supporting oppositional forces in Europe who are themselves 
either opposed to the European Union or who are deeply hostile to the brand of liberalism 
which has come to define Europe as a project. As one seasoned analyst has observed, it is not 
just that  Russia under Putin has become ‘increasingly nationalist and defensive’. Rather it 
would appear to reject the Western liberal order in its entirety. This may not prevent rich 
Russians living in their favourite European cities, sending their children to the best private 
schools, buying property in London, investing in European football teams, or using the 
London law courts to protect their very considerable assets. Russia to this degree remains 
very much part of the capitalist West. But as Ziegler has pointed out, it is not western 
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capitalism which Putin rejects  - indeed one wonders how Russia today could survive without 




In this brief overview I have attempted to do three things: firstly, provide some historical 
perspective when thinking about ‘Europe’; second, point out how the debate about modern 
Europe has shifted rather dramatically from what was probably a premature optimism to what 
some (including the present author) might now  view as overblown pessimism;  and third 
argue that to understand this new downbeat mood we need to shift our gaze away from 
Europe   and extend our perspective by looking at how the international environment has  
changed,  and how this – as much as any architectural flaws -  has reinforced the belief that 
Europe’s position in the world is likely to become increasingly difficult in the years ahead.  
Some time back a British author wrote a powerful and controversial book suggesting  that 
Europe was becoming globally ‘irrelevant’. Unsurprisingly, this was not a message which 
many enthusiasts for the European project seemed prepared to accept at the time. Today one 
feels   that  they have no choice (Youngs, 2010).  
Of course making predictions about the future is impossible; and those who have 
engaged in such speculation in the past have invariably got things wrong! Thus while the 
current relationship between the US and Europe in the age of Trump looks difficult at best 
and possibly disastrous at worst, it is not ruled out that the many interests which the two 
continents have in common will simply force the relationship back into what might be 
described as a normal,  rather pedestrian, but stable, channel. Nor is it guaranteed that China 
will continue to rise or that Russia will for ever pursue its same aggressive policies towards 
the West. Nor moreover is the current situation within Europe bound to last for another ten 
years. Indeed, if the history of Europe has shown anything it is how innovative it has been in 
the past when faced with apparently insoluble problems; and there is no imminent reason why 
it should not also find ways out of its current  travails.  
However, as I have implied here, any long term answer to Europe’s  problems depends 
just as much on what happens outside Europe as happens within it. Europe may indeed find a 
way forward and a way out of  its own  crisis. Some even feel that the  ‘Trump challenge’  is 
precisely what Europe needs right now  to force it to  take the painful but necessary decisions 
that will better guarantee its future. But even if  this were to happen, Europe would still face a 
world composed of powerful states  - states which together possess formidable assets which 
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can either work to Europe’s advantage or disadvantage. Either way, none of these very 
different states are about to go away any time soon. Viewed from this all important global 
perspective, Europe’s future is going to depend just as much if not more on the actions, 
policies and attitudes of  the other major actors in the international system as it will on 
decisions taken in Brussels, Berlin or Paris. In this very specific sense the fate of Europe 
today – and here we need to draw at least one lesson from the Cold War – continues to 
depend on those all-important players  we still refer to today (albeit with less and less 
intellectual confidence) as  the superpowers. 
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